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normative order, the separation of powers becomes a mere formal distinction without substantive meaning. Yet, it was conceived as a political idea covering certain
processes of the state as a social reality and was intended to establish a system of political checks and balances."
In the final phase of his discussion, Ebenstein points to the moment of indeterminacy and therefore unpredictability of the law which results from the volitional
element in all steps of the legal process. Emphasizing that the Pure Theory includes
the unknowable as an inevitable part of the legal order, the author quotes a significant
statement of Merkl: "The science of law as a science of legal norms does not compromise itself when it says that it does not know what is the law for a particular case;
after all, it does know it in rendering the unequivocal and doubtlessly correct judgment: law is what the law-applying authority on the basis of the legal norm recognizes as law." 8
This statement is, of course, a contradiction of the traditional theory that the legal
norm as a rule of human conduct must possess certainty and if lacking this quality
does not constitute positive law. Here, one remembers Holmes' remark, also quoted
by Ebenstein, that law is nothing but the prophecies of what the courts will do. The
Pure Theory recognizes the inherent dependence of the legal process on social and
other factual phenomena. The purity of the theory consists only in confining its scope
to the formal structure of the legal system and excluding the consideration of all other
elements which enter into the positive order of the law.
The time has not yet come for a full appraisal of the historical importance of the
Pure Theory. Yet it seems that it represents a climax of an era of analytical jurisprudence foreboding in its own system the rise of a new conception of legal science.
The foregoing review was necessarily limited to some important points of the Pure
Theory which is almost completely presented in Mr. Ebenstein's book. The only
principal topics which the author has omitted are the Vienna School's theories of the
state and of international law. Mr. Ebenstein's book, however, is more than a scholarly presentation of the Pure Theory of Law. His many references to related and parallel
thoughts in German, English, American, French and Italian legal literature make it
instructive and stimulating reading. It is hoped that a translation will make it accessible to all American readers interested in jurisprudence.
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American Foreign Relations. By John Mabry Mathews. New York: D. AppletonCentury Co., 1938. Pp. xvi, 766. $4.00.
This is a "revised and enlarged edition" of the same title which appeared in E928
and which was in turn a greatly enlarged revision of The Conduct of American Foreign
Relations, published in 1922. The book is divided into two parts with fifty pages of
source material in appendices. Part I, consisting of eleven chapters, is concerned with
a general statement on international relations and the development and content of
American foreign policy. Part II, consisting of twenty-one chapters which constitute
more than half of the book, is devoted to the conduct of and the machinery for carry7See Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of the "Separation of Powers,"
L. Rev. 385, 434 et seq. (1935).
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hug on American foreign relations. The chief additions and revisions have been made
in Part I. Every chapter has new material and there are new chapters on the development of American foreign policy, Pan-Americanism, and neutrality. Part II has the
same chapter headings and subtitles throughout as in the former edition.
When the topical arrangement is used, as by Professor Mathews here, the developmental advantages of a chronological treatment cannot be achieved. A partial
solution to this problem kept suggesting itself to the reader. Why could not materials
which are used in different sections be tied together by cross references in footnotes?
Indeed this has been done to some extent in Part II, but a more extensive use of this
technique might make all the materials more readily available.
It appears to this reader that Professor Mathews in his desire to be reasonable,
leans over a little in his too ready acceptance of some of the current isolationist
rationalizations and catchwords. He says that it was a blunder for the United States
to enter the World War unconditionally, to make the world safe for democracy,' that
experience has demonstrated the futility of "war to end war, '2 that the terms of the
treaty of Versailles were too severe,3 and that if Wilson had not gone to Europe to help
make the treaty he would have been in a better position to repudiate its terms.4 It
would appear to this reviewer that the blunder was not so much entering the "war to
end war" as it was the betrayal of that purpose in running out on the peace making.
Though the terms of the treaty may have been too severe, they were as lenient at the
time as the American people would have approved, if the temper of the few Senators
who opposed the League was any reflection of public opinion, as Professor Mathews
seems willing to assume;s but regardless of the severity, the failure of the United States
to participate in organized international life probably did more to make these terms
more rigid than did any other one factor. Wilson was relieved of the opportunity of
repudiation by the Senate, and in the anarchy of the present we witness the fruits of
that repudiation. So, it would seem that the blunder was not so much in entering the
war or in the treaty making, as in the scuttling of the adjustive machinery which was
set up in the treaty to achieve the purpose for which the United States entered the war.
Professor Mathews writes interestingly and dearly. He summarizes complex material in such a way as to make the trees and the woods appear in their proper relations. In fact his chief use of the trees is to give the woods perspective, his use of detail being for illustrative purposes only. This ability to make the main tendencies
stand out is nowhere more apparent than in his treatment of the Monroe Doctrine. 6
His organization is well done and dear. Its merit becomes particularly noticeable
when one reaches the discussion of the non-recognition policy, beginning on page i8, in
which the organization is commonplace. The book should be especially valuable for
the lay reader and for text purposes.
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Annotations on Small Loan Laws. By F. B. Hubachek. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1938. Pp. lxv, 225. $3.00.
The first 144 pages, representing all but 34 pages of the author's contribution, are
taken up mainly with a listing of cases under the various sections of the sixth draft of
the Uniform Small Loans Law as revised January 1, 1935. The cases are preceded with
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